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Agenda item 51
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Protection of civilians and political strategies", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 3 November 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21967 (E) 131216 131216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Protection of civilians and political strategies" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

Background

For over fifteen years, the protection of civilians (POC) has been a peacekeeping priority, where today over 95 per cent of UN peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians. Although the protection of civilians is primarily the responsibility of States, the United Nations has an essential part to play, through peacekeeping operations in particular. Given the complex operating environments into which missions deploy today, protecting civilians require a collective commitment by Member States, peacekeeping operations and others.

Since the late 1990s, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat have developed institutional and operational tools to strengthen UN action in this regard, as illustrated by Security Council resolutions 1265 (1999), 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009), the reports of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and the 2015 DPKO-DFS policy on the protection of civilians. However, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), while highlighting the significant progress made in concepts and standards on protecting civilians, noted that political solutions must take a more central role in mission strategies, and that decisive leadership remained essential to the protection of civilians mandate.

How and why are the protection of civilians and political strategies linked?

Peacekeeping is a fundamentally political tool. The military activities of peacekeepers, while important, are only steps to achieve a political goal. In years past, the primary political goal of peacekeeping operations was often the consolidation of an already agreed peace. In more recent years, peacekeeping missions have increasingly been deployed to help bring parties together and shape a sustainable peace. In such contexts, where conflict may be on-going, civilian lives are at risk and peacekeepers are often called upon to protect them. At the same time, without a viable strategy to resolve the armed conflict that poses threats to civilians in the first place, efforts to protect could end up being protracted and unsustainable.

Protecting civilians is ultimately the responsibility of the host state. Peacekeeping operations frequently have multiple roles in supporting this responsibility. Missions perform the essential task of strengthening state institutions for protection, including police, defence and justice. At the same time, particularly when conflict is ongoing, the capacity and the will by the government to protect its own citizens may not always be present. In such cases, peacekeepers provide protection to civilians under threat and a sense of safety for the population. Navigating these roles require political strategies based on solid assessments and analysis.

Effective linkages between protection of civilian efforts to political strategies can lead to successful prevention. The concerted international engagement in the early phases of the UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is an illustrative example. In a country with a weak national army and deep religious and ethnic divisions, peacekeepers stabilized key areas of the country, including the capital Bangui and hotspots in the centre of the country.

Between 2014 and 2015, strong political engagement and mediation at the international, regional, and national levels, paired with responses of all civilian and uniformed actors on the ground, enabled a visible countrywide deployment at the community levels. The mission made a concerted effort at harmonizing engagement with international actors in CAR, and such consultative strategies allowed stronger action, which helped prevent widespread bloodshed.

Although many challenges remain in CAR, this experience shows us how coordinated political engagement and sustained dialogue with all partners, from the local to the international stage, can lead to effective protection.

It shows particularly the importance of working with regional and sub-regional actors when they are playing a constructive role in promoting political solutions.

Challenges

The overarching challenge of protection is political. This can be articulated at a number of levels: first, devising political strategies to resolve conflict around which the Security Council, troop and police contributors, and the Secretariat may rally around. Second, addressing the political will of host authorities in the protection of their own citizens, and third, ensuring that the political commitment exists from key stakeholders – in particular troop and police contributors – to fulfil sometime dangerous and risky POC tasks.

1. POC and political engagement

The High Level Panel on Peace Operations warned against using the peacekeeping principles as a shield for inaction. One could also posit that POC should not be used as a shield for political inaction. Across a number of theatres, peacekeepers have been mandated to protect civilians amidst ongoing conflict, absent a viable political process. In such instances, there is a humanitarian imperative to protect, but peacekeepers cannot replace efforts to resolve conflict, which require sustained political engagement, creativity and partnership-building. Protection mandates are frequently framed in highly operational, even tactical, terms, despite the strategic nature of Council resolutions. High-visibility peacekeeping deployments risk eclipsing the difficult work of pursuing political solutions, shifting the onus of the international community's engagement in a war-torn country away from the Security Council's responsibilities, to the performance of peacekeepers.

Solutions to close the gap require unity in the Council, through enhanced coordination and dialogue between Council members. By clarifying how the Council views the mission's

protection activities as contributing to a context-specific political process, peacekeepers will have a far greater understanding of their role and will execute it more effectively. To feed the discussion, the Secretariat has a duty to formulate clear recommendations on the course of action, based on solid analysis of the threats and context, allowing the Council to formulate, prioritize, and sequence mandated tasks. The Secretariat is currently working on a number of initiatives in this regard, including strengthening methodologies relating to the information management cycle, and capacities for situational awareness and threat analysis. In particular, the Secretariat is in the process of developing a policy that will provide a framework for effective, efficient and responsible information gathering and analysis across all mission components, allowing a better understanding of dynamics within the area of operation as well as real early warning of specific threats. Such efforts will help better identify and anticipate threats and plan accordingly, which provide a clearer vision to ensure T/PCCs are on board with the proposed modus operandi.

2. POC and the host state

Host governments have the primary responsibility to protect civilians. But this role may not be fulfilled, either because the government lacks the will – as is the case in South Sudan or Syria – or the government lacks the capacity – as is the case in CAR or Mali. Where host governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, and a peacekeeping operation has a POC mandate, the mission has the responsibility to intervene to protect civilians. This can give rise to situations when the peacekeepers may have to use force against their hosts, the very authorities that consented to their deployment.

In cases where there is a lack of will, increased dialogue with the host government is critical to protect civilians, while simultaneously leveraging influential parties to address the lack of will. The use of sanctions and compacts could also be considered. In cases where there is a lack of capacity, the peacekeeping operation should focus on the provision of logistical support and capacity-building efforts for the national security and corrections entities, through training and joint operations, based on the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of the United Nations.

3. POC and T/PCC ownership

Political commitment by T/PCCs to carry out the mandate is vital to ensure that the mission performs to the standard expected by the Security Council. Equally, there is a need to ensure that, in each specific instance, there is consensus on what is being asked of troops and police and what is expected of them, particularly with regard to the use of force. In South Sudan, peacekeepers have been criticised for inaction in not confronting a government army equipped with mortars, tanks and attack helicopters. As electoral violence flares up in some countries, we are potentially facing scenarios in which Missions are expected to protect civilians from government forces. In such situations, T/PCCs and the Security Council must have a clear vision of the extent to which the peacekeeping operation is capable and willing to implement its mandate[1].

[1] A range of tools support collective and coordinated action in these complex environments, such as the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Directives on the Use of Force (DUF), Concepts of Operations (ConOps), UN

Dialogue among Security Council, T/PCCs and Secretariat

While all of these efforts contribute to improving the effective implementation of the POC mandate, the political dialogue precludes any agreement on engagement. The Secretary-General in his report (A/70/357-S/2015/682) underscored that sustained dialogue among the Security Council, T/PCCs and Secretariat is essential, including prior to the establishment of a mission. The Secretary-General advanced options for strengthening this dialogue, including Secretariat and Security Council briefings to potential contributors on its conflict assessment before an operation is authorized. Such briefings would allow potential contributors to consider capability requirements and give the Council an opportunity to gather views on challenges and opportunities on potential mandated tasks. They could also allow opportunity to share views on the question of assessment of threats driving capability requirements and planning.

While various consultation formats exist, there appear to be limited opportunities for a meaningful discussion between the Security Council, T/PCCs, the Secretariat and the host State. Such discussions are critical, given the political challenges described above, and the need for clearer consensus around expectations and the will to protect civilians. The Security Council Working Group (SCWG) has held meetings on cross-cutting and mission-specific thematic issues, to which T/PCCs are frequently invited, providing a useful forum for discussion. These discussions could be further advanced through informal mechanisms to allow substantive discussions. Through such dialogue, T/PCCs would gain well-rounded views of POC mandates and challenges, as well as on the ROE and DUF prior to deployment.

The protection of civilians is more than a temporary answer to physical violence; therefore it requires more than a temporary military solution. Effective protection requires a political process that can lead to the creation of a protective environment for sustainable peace.

Challenges and Discussion Questions

1. How can the Security Council better reflect the effective linkages between political strategies and POC? How could this be reflected in mandate language?
2. What are the expectations of the host state, particularly in cases where they pose a threat to civilians? What are the Council's expectations towards peacekeepers in such cases?
3. How can the Council, T/PCCs and Secretariat conduct effective dialogue regarding challenges to implementing POC mandates?
4. How can the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat ensure an inclusive and substantive exchange on the relationship between threat assessment, conflict analysis and dialogue for new and existing mandates?
5. How can the Security Council and T/PCCs better manage expectations for peacekeeping?

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command and control arrangements (C2), highlighting responsibilities and clarifying the relationship between military operations and political engagement in the mission. The Operational Readiness Assurance (ORA) policy supports the respective responsibilities between troop contributors, Secretariat and field missions, allowing a clear approach to evaluating performance of uniformed components, which should strengthen dialogue with T/PCCs. The Secretariat will continue to pursue efforts to better mainstream POC in mission planning processes and documents and improve training on POC at all levels (pre-deployment and in-mission).

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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

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Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Peacekeeping operations, terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, opportunities and implications", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 24 June 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21670 (E) 131216 131216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping, terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, opportunities and implications" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

Background

Senegal, as chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, will hold a thematic discussion to consider the challenges, opportunities and implications of terrorism and violent extremism for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. The discussion will bring together Security Council members and a broad range of Member States.

Terrorism and violent extremism as emerging issues for UN peacekeeping

Over the past two decades, the security environments of UN peace operations have become significantly more complex. Peacekeepers are today deployed in volatile and non-permissive contexts, often in the absence of an established peace agreement or, on occasion, without a political process underway. In many of these environments, a diverse range of state and non-state armed groups operate, many of which employ terrorism (asymmetric violence), including targeting of civilians and/or the UN to further their goals. The use of asymmetric and terrorist tactics by parties to conflict raises challenges for the safety and security of UN personnel and for the delivery of mandated tasks by UN peacekeepers. Over the past decade, the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States have sought to enhance the mandate and capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations to negotiate the increased threats of asymmetric violence, in particular in contexts of protection of civilians' mandates.

More recent attention has focused on violent extremism as a subset of asymmetric violence. Part of the challenge in addressing this topic is that there is no shared definition of violent extremism in policy or intergovernmental circles, and groups that are often said to espouse violent extremism differ widely in their location, composition and tactics.[1] Nevertheless, violent extremism could be described as a commitment to violent means (i.e., terrorism) in order to attain goals that are incompatible with the international state system, an adherence to transnational violent ideologies and *a priori* rejection of negotiated political settlements. These features, particularly when combined with a justification of the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians and rejection of international humanitarian and human rights norms and standards, pose significant challenges for all areas of the UN work. The prevalence and growth in manifestations of violent extremism in areas of existing conflict,[2] however, pose particular challenges for the UN peace and security frameworks and instruments, of which the most visible is UN peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping within the UN framework for violent extremism

[1] This is due to a range of political, ideological and legal factors, as well as the multidisciplinary approach which has been taken to study the phenomenon; see M. Nasser-Eddine *et. al.* (2011) *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review* (Edinburgh: Ministry of Defence, Australia).

[2] International Crisis Group (2016) "Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State", *Crisis Group Special Report*, 14 March.

protective equipment, including mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles; and testing the use of new technologies, including the use of advanced aerial surveillance tools to enhance the safety and security of bases and convoys.

In Mali, despite the establishment of a peace agreement between the Government and key armed groups, the mission operates in an environment of continued low-level insurgency, targeted attacks on the UN and spectacular attacks on civilian targets (e.g. hotels, hostage taking). In addition to defending itself against a significant direct threat from multiple extremist groups, MINUSMA has a mandate to prevent and deter attacks against civilians by armed groups of any persuasion. For this protection purpose, as with other similarly-mandated missions, the Security Council has authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 2015, DPKO identified MINUSMA as a pilot Mission for CT/PVE national capacity building in the areas of rule of law and security. Efforts, in coordination with DPKO, CTED, CITTF, and other partners, include training and support to national security forces in first response, investigations, forensics analysis, and aspects of C-IED. MINUSMA is also playing a critical role in standing up the Specialized Counter Terrorism Judici..l Unit and is supporting the Government's efforts to develop a national border security strategy aimed at preventing the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and proliferation of arms. MINUSMA is also supporting the development of a comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy

A range of other peacekeeping operations, including MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNMISS and MINUSTAH are also mandated to support the capacity of national institutions and actors, particularly rule of law and security institutions. In line with Pillar III of the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, UN peacekeeping operations, often have a comparative advantage as part of their programmatic support to the rule of law and security institutions, to contribute to counter terrorism capacity building efforts, inter alia, in judicial reform, the prevention of radicalization in detention facilities, security sector reform (SSR), border management and policing.,

Challenges

1- There is a need to adapt peacekeeping presences and activities to the emerging enviornment, including equip peacekeeping missions with the capabilities necessary to counter asymmetric threats and tactics through better access to intelligence, technology and IED threat mitigation programmes, while improving resilience through greater mobility and medical support capacity. There is also a need to consider how mandates tasks including in the areas of DDR and corrections support need to adapt in such environments.

2Addressing the dual threats of terrorism and 'violent extremism' and distinguishing terrorist groups from other non-state armed groups employing asymmetric violent tactics, as well as the diversity and fluidity of such groups, present a significant challenge for UN peacekeeping missions. Labelling armed groups "terrorists" or "violent extremists" can sometimes undermine a solid and nuanced understanding of these groups and the specific conflict contexts in which they operate, including their perception by local populations. This can limit the scope of missions to develop detailed analyses of the specificities of each context and/or group and to design tailored and appropriate responses. Moreover, the capacity of missions to analyse and assess such groups is often limited in the context of prevailing insecurity, the transnational operating patterns of these groups and limited

- What is the implication for relations with host States and local communities of UN peacekeeping engagement in addressing violent extremism?
- How could peacekeeping cooperate more effectively with other parts of the UN system on initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism?
- What are the associated challenges and risks? To what extent can the Security Council mitigate those challenges, and how?

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Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Technology and innovation in peacekeeping", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 28 April 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21966 (E) 131216 131216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Technology and innovation in United Nations peacekeeping" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

I- BACKGROUND

The threats faced by United Nations peacekeeping operations are evolving rapidly. Mandates are becoming increasingly complex and the operating environments into which missions deploy are ever more challenging. It is therefore critical to ensure that peacekeeping operations possess the right tools to meet the challenges they face, so that peacekeeping remains an efficient and effective enterprise in years to come. In mid-2014 an Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping was appointed by the Under-Secretaries-General of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support to consider how modern technology could be leveraged to enhance the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and overcome some of the emerging challenges they face. The Panel's report, released in February 2015, argues for wider deployment of technology in peacekeeping and proposes a new approach that enables innovative problem solving. The Panel's message was echoed by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which recommended that the UN "embrace innovation and the responsible use of technology to bridge the considerable gap between what is readily available to and appropriate for UN peace operations and what is actually in use in the field today". In his report on the implementation of the High-Level Panel's recommendations, the Secretary-General pledged that technology would be a key element of the peacekeeping reform agenda. He stated also his conviction that the adoption of widely available and cost-effective technologies can make huge strides towards improving the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets, as well the capacity to protect civilians and to implement mandates effectively. Furthermore, he underlined that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have put in place a strategy to implement the key recommendations of the recent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in United Nations Peacekeeping.

II- OVERVIEW OF DPKO/DFS STRATEGY AND TECHNICAL AREAS OF WORK

DPKO/DFS strategy

This increased institutional focus on and support for technology in peacekeeping operations has provided a strong basis for significant steps taken by DPKO/DFS to enhance its work in this area and has precipitated a shift in DFS' focus toward strategic, field-focused technologies. In 2015, DPKO/DFS elaborated a strategy to implement the recommendations of the Expert Panel and initiated a progressive exercise to introduce new tools, working methods and operational approaches to technology in peacekeeping. The strategy, which operates in line with the broader ICT Strategy for the Secretariat, seeks to bring about a cultural shift towards embracing technology and innovation, including through continual and strengthened cooperation and dialogue with Member States and other stakeholders. In addition to implementing the technical recommendations of the Expert Panel, the strategy seeks to deliver a new approach that puts missions, users and substantive offices in a central role for identifying technological solutions. The strategy expands the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping, which provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation with Member States and other partners around technology for peacekeeping. The second annual Symposium for the Partnership was held in Vienna, Austria, in September 2015 and brought together representatives of over 30 Member States as well as academic institutions to explore creative and collaborative opportunities to enhance technology efforts in peacekeeping missions.

Technical areas of work

The follow are several key areas where the DPKO/DFS strategy seeks to achieve significant and immediate progress to overcome critical operational challenges.

Safety and security

Comprehensive technology suites appropriate to different mission environments can significantly improve safety and security of UN personnel, infrastructure and assets and enhance camp perimeter surveillance and control. DPKO/DFS is currently piloting the use of day and night optical sensors mounted on both fixed and mobile platforms, including balloons and aerostats which offer long-range, 360 degree visibility around their installation, providing us a longer horizon from a position of safety. Similar technology applied to mobile platforms

like quadcopters also supports more effective and safer patrolling and convoy protection. By using a combination of sensors, CCTV, motion sensors and infrared and ground radar together with mobile surveillance systems, missions will be in a better position to identify threats more quickly and respond more rapidly. In response to the High Level Panel on Technology and Innovation, UNMAS updated the "Landmine and Explosive Remnant of War Safety" mobile phone application to include information on IEDs. UNMAS is developing a strategy for sharing lessons learned, in cooperation with Member States with experience in IED threat mitigation. In contexts where prohibitions exist on the use of traditional explosive disposal tools, UNMAS is innovative, for example, by using a pyrotechnic torch that safely disposes of explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions, without the need for explosives.

Operational communications

At the heart of command and control communications is reliable connectivity and related enabling technologies. To enhance field connectivity beyond existing satellite networks, DFS is exploring a variety of new technologies to substantially increase the available coverage and bandwidth to field missions with the specific goal of reaching the "last mile" of operations, especially in austere environments where commercial terrestrial links are unavailable or unreliable. In this regard DFS is adding the use of newly available next-generation medium earth orbiting satellite networks to provide increased bandwidth to field missions at a lower cost, including to remote areas that were previously difficult to reach. This will enable a new breed of communication tools to capture and share information in missions.

Situational awareness and information-led operations

Better-informed decision making is critical to safe and effective mandate implementation and better information gathering, verification, analysis and reporting is crucial to information-led operations, situational awareness and a common operating picture. Implementing new technologies in these areas is an important part of DPKO/DFS efforts to expand the capacity of peacekeeping missions to identify conduct information-led operations and, where necessary and appropriate, to enable missions to gather information and analyse intelligence to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and the implementation of the mandate. This increasingly includes the use of Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles by peacekeeping operations to identify threats, collect relevant data and better understand their operating environments. New technologies also offer significant opportunities to strengthen the uniformed capabilities of peacekeeping operations to address emerging rule of law threats, including transnational

organized crime. To better manage the vast amounts on event-based data gathered by peacekeeping missions and support analysis and decision-making, DPKO/DFS has rolled out Sage, a standardised, web-based incident tracking system that makes use of mobile applications and GIS visualization. UNMAS also now uses state-of-the-art technologies and information management systems, such as the Information Management System for Mine Action, to help facilitate mine action activities. Expanded use of GIS solutions will combine situational awareness regarding incidents together with mission-specific operational on detailed mission-specific base maps to support strategic and operational decision making, scenario modelling and planning.

Reducing peacekeeping's environmental footprint

DFS strives to deploy responsible missions that achieve maximum efficiency in their use of natural resources and operate at minimum risk to people, societies and ecosystems; contributing to a positive impact on these wherever possible. The systematic integration of alternative energy sources across all aspects of field operations and the incorporation of a life-cycle approach will significantly decrease missions' environmental footprints and reduce long-term costs. The use of alternative energy sources across all aspects of field operations will not only reduce operational costs in the long run, including the related supply chain for fuel delivery, but also supports more resilient operations. By shifting data centres and ICT infrastructure wherever possible to the UN private cloud hosted in the Global Service Centre (GSC), DFS/DPKO are able to maintain a light ICT infrastructure footprint in the field and reduced power demands. The Global Service Centre data centres, which have been recognized for their green use of solar power, in turn have a positive exponential effect on the field missions who have shifted their data hosting to the GSC.

III- CHALLENGES

As peacekeeping operations have increased their use of strategic technologies, a number of challenges have arisen which affect missions' ability to fully realize the potential of these technologies.

Ensuring full and consistent integration of new technologies

To integrate new technologies in peacekeeping operations, all personnel must have access to training in the operation and maintenance of new systems and tools deployed throughout missions to meet emerging requirements and implement innovative solutions. This requires a holistic approach that sets technical solutions within a larger concept of operations to ensure that personnel using the technologies are capable of operating them and taking appropriate action on the information they receive. This presents significant and unique challenges for peacekeeping operations, given the wide diversity of equipment and technological capacity among military and police units deployed to the field. The DPKO/DFS strategy therefore foresees development of exercises, new specialised training materials, and partnerships with Member States to train and equip units to higher standards of technological capacity. DFS, in partnership with TCCs and other Member States, has established a training academy in Entebbe to augment capacities of military signals units prior to deployment. The Signals Academy aims to standardise the basic curricula for signals units as well as tailored training for specific mission operating environments. This approach will improve the performance and capabilities of signals units, which are increasingly required to deploy in non-permissive environments.

Prototyping, field-testing and evaluating technologies

At present, the capacity of DPKO/DFS to leverage technology and integrate solutions into the operational environment of peacekeeping missions does not sufficiently support a process of identifying new technology opportunities, prototyping, field-testing, evaluating and optimizing these solutions. This is particularly difficult when interoperability requirements apply and/or technologies need to be field tested in harsh environments. As a result, DPKO/DFS must often procure equipment and services that are commercially available on the market for deployment in active field missions without the opportunity for sufficient field-testing and development of standard operating procedures for users. This has presented challenges for effectively incorporating new technologies in support of uniformed capabilities as well as other substantive areas of peacekeeping. In contrast, nearly all military or police forces worldwide test technologies, systems, solutions and procedures intensively before deploying them to live operations. To mitigate this issue, the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping is seeking strengthen partnerships with Member States and other entities that could enhance peacekeeping's solution development and testing capacity while remaining fully compliant with procurement rules.

Information security

As peacekeeping operations make increasing use of digital information, persistent concerns have arisen about the capacity of missions to securely and confidentially manage the gathering, storage and ultimate disposition of information. The sustainability of efforts to enhance peacekeeping mission's capabilities in this area will therefore depend on the Organization's capacity to put effective measures in place to satisfy these information management concerns. Information security in peacekeeping is dependent upon two programmes: sensitive information handling policy, training and awareness; and, an ICT infrastructure which ensures protection of information assets within the UN environment. To address the rising amount of digital information in peacekeeping, several steps have been taken including the development of a mandatory online training module on information sensitivity; procedures to automatically classify and protect sensitive information in line with Organizational policy; and an established ICT Security capacity in the GSC working in coordination with OICT to ensure a holistic approach to network and application level security controls and monitoring. This includes the implementation of the Secretariat ICT Security Plan across all field missions. Broader awareness of the risks in managing sensitive information and additional ICT controls are needed. To that end, peacekeeping will be engaging in outreach and assessments of missions handling of sensitive information, and will be implementing digital rights management tools to protect confidential materials.

IV- Key Questions for Consideration

- How can the use of technology be a way to achieve a cost-effective and efficient peacekeeping?
- How can the use of technology enhance the safety and security of UN peacekeeping operations?
- How can the use of technology enhance the tools and capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations to effectively carry out their mandates, in particular to protect civilians?
- How can effective cooperation between, PCCs, TCCs, host countries and the Secretariat be enhanced to reduce the capacities gaps and to promote a responsible use of technology in peacekeeping operations?

- How can concerns about the use of Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) and drones, in particular the issue of confidentiality and information gathering and monitoring be addressed?
- How can the Security Council support the use of technology by peacekeeping operations by providing the Secretariat with a strong mandate to explore, procure and deploy new solutions?
- What can Member States do to facilitate the enhanced use of "green" technologies?
- How can the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping be expanded?
- Can Member States help ensure systematic integration of new technologies through increased efforts to equip and build the capacity of TCCs/PCCs?

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14 December 2016

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Identical letters dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing once again with regard to the continued military hostilities committed by the Houthi militias and military units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on the Saudi border as well as within Saudi Arabia's territorial limits, in flagrant violation of the security and safety of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2216 (2015).

I attach herewith a list of numerous attacks violating the 48-hour ceasefire declared on 19 November 2016, committed by Houthi-Saleh militias. The 328 violations took place between provinces in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including Najran, Jazan and the Yemeni side (see annex). These violations are risking the lives of the civilian population in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as well as undermining all efforts to restore the peace and security in the region.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reaffirms its right to take all appropriate measures to respond to these aggressive acts, counter the attacks of the Iran-funded and backed Houthi-Saleh militias, and protect the security and safety of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its people, and the region, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

We once again call upon the Security Council to condemn the unlawful acts by the Houthis and their allies and take appropriate measures against the countries supporting and associating with the Houthi militias and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in their crimes and their threat to the region's security and safety.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reiterates its support to the important work of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, to reach a comprehensive agreement to end the conflict in Yemen, in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and its implementation mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated to all members of the Council and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

16-22174 (E) 231216

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Ceasefire violations by the enemy on our southern border in the Jazan sector from 1200 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438 to 1800 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1230 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Hostile personnel entered the Fadnah post	Dealt with
1330 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Machine-gun fire at border marker 43	Dealt with
1345 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Machine-gun fire behind Buyut al-Sharif	Dealt with
1725 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Two artillery shells landed at border marker 38	Dealt with
1735 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	55 mm machine-gun fire at border marker 49	Dealt with
1740 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	A mortar shell landed at border marker 14	Dealt with
1740 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	A mortar shell landed at border marker 8	Dealt with
1740 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	An artillery shell landed at border marker 38 (Siraj)	Dealt with
1758 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	A mortar shell landed on the village of Mi'zab.	Dealt with
1830 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	55 mm machine-gun fire at border marker 49	Dealt with
1830 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	55 mm machine-gun fire	Dealt with
1855 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Sniper fire behind border marker 27	Dealt with
1905 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Sniper fire at border markers 47 and 48	Dealt with
1920 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Personal-weapons fire intermittently from north of Julah	Dealt with
2017 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Two shells landed on Matlah	Dealt with

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
2030 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	A shell landed in Matlah	Dealt with
2245 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Sniper fire opposite border marker 25	Dealt with
0646 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Anti-armour missiles opposite border marker 57	Dealt with
0654 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	55 mm gunfire at Julah	Dealt with
0706 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Two artillery shells landed on Khawiyah	Dealt with
0707 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Two artillery shells landed behind Jabal Tayyash	Dealt with
0740 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Hostile sniper fire at Qarn	Dealt with
0820 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	A mortar shell landed on Mabkharah	Dealt with
0829 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	A mortar shell landed on Mi'zab	Dealt with
0839 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	Machine-gun fire at Wadi Abdullah	Dealt with
0847 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Sniper fire at Fadnah	Dealt with
0858 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	55 mm machine-gun fire at Malhamah	Dealt with
0912 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Sniper fire at Malhamah	Dealt with
0925 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	An artillery shell landed on Mi'zab	Dealt with
1029 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	55 mm machine gun fire opposite border marker 44	Dealt with
1506 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	55 mm machine-gun fire at Hillah	Dealt with
1614 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 1	55 mm machine-gun opposite Qushur	Dealt with
1614 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Direct fire at Khawiyah	Dealt with
1623 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Hostile sniper fire at Khawiyah	Dealt with
1720 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	A shell landed on Kurs	Dealt with
1730 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Jazan 2	Two shells landed behind border marker 42	Dealt with

Ceasefire violations by the enemy on our southern border in the Najran sector from 1200 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438 to 1800 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1220 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A hostile shell landed opposite the Naffakh observation post at border marker 246	Dealt with
1230 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A hostile shell landed next to the rear entrance to Thuwaylah	Dealt with
1230 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper fire at the Waqbah observation post	Dealt with
1235 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper fire at the Waqbah observation post	Dealt with
1235 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper fire at Waqbah emplacement 12	Dealt with
1235 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper, RPG and mortar fire at Sakha (Nimr 24/Nimr 32)	Dealt with
1245 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Eight shells landed on Sahwah, Ufqah, Hisn, Sahn and Namsah	Dealt with
1245 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper fire at Nimr 17	Dealt with
1245 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Two RPGs landed on Sahwah and Athin	Dealt with
1245 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A shell landed on the Athin observation post	Dealt with
1315 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Sniper fire at Qu'ayqa' observation post 5	Dealt with
1320 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	50 mm fire opposite the Miraghi al-Qadimah observation post	Dealt with
1345 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Direct fire at the Ahmad observation post	Dealt with
1350 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Sniper fire at the Sahwah observation post	Dealt with
1249 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A hostile shell fell on the Athin observation post	Dealt with
1416 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper fire at Waqbah emplacement 10	Dealt with

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1425 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Sniper fire at the Asharah observation post	Dealt with
1455 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Shells landed behind Qu'ayqa' 9 and Qu'ayqa' 11	Dealt with
1510 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Sniper fire at Qu'ayqa' 9 and Qu'ayqa' 11	Dealt with
1522 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Hostile sniper fire at the Ghayth observation post	Dealt with
1547 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Intensive fire from two hostile snipers at Nimr 10 and Nimr 11 at Waqbah observation post	Dealt with
1615 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Hostile sniper fire at the Sahwah observation post	Dealt with
1637 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Hostile sniper fire sniper fire at Nimr emplacement 10 at the Waqbah observation post	Dealt with
1635 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A hostile shell landed between the Saudi Nimr observation post and the Dhiyab observation post	Dealt with
1700 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Six shells landed at Nimr 16 in Makhruq, injuring an officer and a private from the national forces	Dealt with
1710 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Two mortar shells landed near Brigade Group 4 command	Dealt with
1712 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	One mortar shell landed south of the Asharah observation post	Dealt with
1727 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Hostile sniper fire at the Sulfah observation post	Dealt with
1730 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Two mortar shells landed south of Shurfah	Dealt with
1730 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A hostile shell fell in front of Sha'b al-Qawm	Dealt with
1734 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Hostile sniper fire at the Dab'ah observation post	Dealt with

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1740 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A mortar shell landed south of the Athin observation post	Dealt with
1742 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Hostile sniper fire at the Sahwah observation post	Dealt with
1745 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Four RPGs and sniper fire at the Misyal observation post	Dealt with
1800 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Shells fell on the Asharah, Azab and Waqbah observation posts	Dealt with
1929 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	RPG fire on the Jurf al-Haddad observation post	Dealt with
1940 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Hostile anti-aircraft fire south of Shu'ayb al-Salah	Dealt with
1950 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Hostile sniper fire at Nimr 10	Dealt with
2000 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Hostile sniper fire at the Waqbah observation post	Dealt with
2030 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	50 mm machine-gun fire opposite the Miraghi al-Qadimah observation post	Dealt with
2045 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Machine-gun fire at the Ahmad observation post	Dealt with
2100 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Sniper fire at the Sahwah observation post	Dealt with
2130 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Intensive sniper fire sniper fire at Waqbah observation post and Nimr emplacement 10	Dealt with
2322 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Hostile sniper fire at Nimr 25	Dealt with
2230 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Hostile sniper fire at the Tha'r observation post	Dealt with
0010 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran (2)	Hostile sniper fire at Nimr observation post 22 and Nimr 2	Dealt with
0015 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Hostile sniper fire at Qu'ayqa' 4 and Qu'ayqa' 5	Dealt with
0016 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	RPG landed on Nimr observation post 30	Dealt with

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
0016 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 2	Hostile sniper fire at the Nimr observation post 16	Dealt with
0303 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Hostile sniper fire at Qu'ayqa' observation post 5	Dealt with
0350 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 3	Hostile sniper fire at Qu'ayqa' observation post 5	Dealt with
0637 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A shell landed on the Sihab observation post	Dealt with
0850 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A shell fell on the at the Dab'ah observation post, killing a soldier	Dealt with
0902 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	Hostile sniper fire at the Dhiyab observation post	Dealt with
1940 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Najran 1	A shell landed on the Thuwaylah observation post	Dealt with

Ceasefire violations by the enemy in the Yemeni interior from 1200 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438 to 1800 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1227 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Sahn al-Watan	Rocket launched	Detected but not intercepted
1331 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Sahn al-Watan	Rocket launched	Detected but not intercepted
1400 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Midi	23 mm machine-gun fire at electric plant injured four privates from forces loyal to the legitimate Government	Dealt with
1445 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Midi	Fire at the 82nd Brigade from a BMP armoured combat vehicle	Dealt with
1209-1242 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Jawf (Silan camp, Maslub, Matun, Ham, Wadi Aqabah and Sabrayn)	17 violations (artillery shelling, mortar fire, fire from a BMP armoured combat vehicle, direct fire, RPG fire, fire from a BTR armoured personnel carrier, artillery fire, howitzer fire and 23 mm artillery fire)	Dealt with
Ongoing	Ta'izz (all fronts)	Fire at posts belonging to the army and the legitimate opposition on all fronts in Ta'izz	Dealt with
1530-1615 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Ta'izz (the Shu'ubah area in Ma'afir and Salw)	Katyusha rocket landed in the Shu'ubah area in Ma'afir, and artillery shelling (howitzers and mortars) of the city centre from Tabbat al-Silal and Ja'shah	Dealt with
1217-1715 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Sana'a (Furdat Naham)	12 violations (shelling from various weapons, 23 and 12.7 mm artillery fire)	Dealt with

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1230-1715 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Ta'izz (Wadi al-Tabaddud, Muhafazah neighbourhood, Hawd neighbourhood, Mafalis, Shu'ubah, Ma'afir, the water plant, Tha'bat, Damghah, Bayt al-Makhlu', Tabbat al-Khazzan, the Ashbat neigbourhood, the Sha'b school area)	27 violations, including shelling from tanks, mortars, howitzers and Katyusha rockets; strikes from 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm machine-gun fire, killing two and injuring two others	Dealt with
1800-2000 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Midi	Mortar fire at the electric plant; three rockets fired at the Yemeni Army loyal to the legitimate Government	Dealt with
1700 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Buq', Zafin and Khashba'	Ceasefire violated by the enemy with several mortar shells against our forces deployed at the location	Dealt with
1800 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Ma'rib (Bayhan and Harib)	Shelling of some opposition and brigade posts by BMP infantry attack vehicles; enemy reinforced by five pickup trucks arriving via Qandha' pass at 1700 hours	Dealt with
2320 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Midi (10th Brigade and 2nd Border Guard Brigade)	Katyusha rockets fired	Dealt with
0035 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Ma'rib (Bayhan and Harib)	Shelling of brigade posts and attached opposition forces loyal to the legitimate Government (Katyusha rockets, artillery and mortar shells)	Dealt with

Time	*Location*	*Hostile activity*	*Action taken*
1500-2355 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Aden (Jabal al-Shawkah, city centre, Salw, lower Tabbat al-Aryal, Zunuj, Tabbat al-Khazzan, Tabbat Yasin, Madabi, Usayfirah, Mukalkal, the military quarter, Dabab, the 35th Brigade, Sawma'ah and Wadi Salah)	141 violations involving various weapons (howitzers, tanks, 14.5 machine guns, Katyusha rockets, mortars, 23 mm anti-aircraft guns, snipers, B-10 guns and RPGs)	Dealt with
0030 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Midi sector, against the 10th Brigade and 2nd Border Guard Brigade	Five Katyusha rockets and two artillery shells fired	Dealt with
1720-2355 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Ta'izz (Salw, Zunuj, city centre, Dabab, military quarter, Zahrah neighbourhood)	132 violations involving various weapons (Katyushas, artillery, machine-gun fire, tank shelling)	Dealt with
1700-1945 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	Sana'a (Naham)	Mortar shelling, artillery shelling, direct fire	Dealt with
1209-1748 hours on 19 Safar A.H. 1438	On the Fil, Maslub, Matun, Aqabah and Sabrin fronts	Mortar, artillery and howitzer shells	Dealt with
0005 hours on 20 Safar A.H. 1438	Sahn al-Watan	Rocket launched	Detected and intercepted

United Nations S/2016/1021

Security Council

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7 December 2016
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period from 29 November to 1 December 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

16-21673 (E) 081216 091216

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Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (29 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of two populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,005.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire application forms have been signed with the leaders of armed groups. The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire has increased to 88.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 40 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (20), Damascus governorate (16), Dar'a governorate (2), Hama governorate (1) and Ladhiqiyah governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar, the Adawi neighbourhood and the area near Abbasiyin stadium in Jawbar, and the highway near Harasta.

Ahrar al-sham fighters used mortars to shell Azizi in Aleppo governorate and government troop positions near Abu Ali mountain in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

Syrian Free Army units used multiple launch-rocket systems to shell the Salah al-Din neighbourhood in Aleppo city.

In Aleppo, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple launch-rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on the Binyamin (twice), Dahiyat al-Assad, Bayadin, Layramun, Bustan al-Basha, Ramusah, Shaykh Khidr, Ashrafiyah, Shurfah and 1070 neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy, the area near the former military school, the Aleppo citadel, the Castello trade centre, the Hikmah School, and areas near the paperboard factory and the watermelon market.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Irbin (twice), Bilaliyah, Hawsh Kharabu (twice), Hawsh Nasri (twice), Jawbar, Bala al-Qadimah, the Ibn Sina Hospital, an electric power station in Jawbar and the Wafidin camp.

Terrorist shelled Tall Sheliyah and Jadilah in Dar'a governorate; and Suran in Hama governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours four humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- Approximately 3 tons to Jibrin in Aleppo governorate
- 2.5 tons to Masyaf in Hama governorate
- Approximately 1 ton to Unaybah in Qunaytirah governorate
- Approximately 1 ton to Qarjaliyah in Ladhiqiyah governorate

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (30 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of two populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate (1) and Qunaytirah governorate (1).

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,007.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 88.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 38 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (20), Damascus governorate (15), Ladhiqiyah governorate (2), and Hama governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar, Harasta and Hawsh Nasri.

Ahrar al-Sham fighters used mortars to shell Azizi in Aleppo governorate; and the positions of Syrian Armed Forces near Abu Ali mountain (twice) in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

Syrian Free Army units used multiple launch-rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on the Salah al-Din and Mashariqah neighbourhoods in Aleppo city.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple launch-rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms to fire on Shurfah and also on the Binyamin, Jam'iyat al-Fayha', Dahiyat al-Assad, Amri, Aqil, Aryan, Shaykh Sa'd, Andalus, Karan Jabal, Jabal Badro, Ard Sabah and 1070 neighbourhoods, the Hikmah School, the Castello trade centre, and the area near the paperboard factory and the watermelon market in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Irbin (three times), Bilaliyah, Hawsh Kharabu (twice), Hawsh Nasri (twice) and Bala al-Qadimah, an electric power station and a sports ground in Jawbar, and the Wafidin camp.

In Hama governorate, terrorists shelled Mu'ardis.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which announced that they would cease hostilities and informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours one humanitarian operation was carried out in the Sakhur district of Aleppo city and in the Mahalij camp for refugees of Aleppo governorate, during which approximately 11 tons of humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

Over the past 24 hours, 6,020 citizens, including 3,113 children, have left besieged areas of Aleppo city with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (1 December 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of five populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,012.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 88.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 36 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (19), Damascus governorate (13), Hama governorate (2) and Dar'a governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar, Bilaliyah, Harasta and Mathanat Husayniyah.

In Aleppo governorate, armed elements of the Syrian Free Army used "hellfire" improvised multiple launch-rocket systems and mortars to shell the Bayadah and Antari neighbourhoods in Aleppo city.

In Ladhiqiyah governorate, armed elements of Ahrar al-Sham used mortars to shell government troop positions near the area at elevation point 323.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple launch-rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms to fire on Shurfah and also on the Binyamin, Shaykh Sa'd, 1070, 3000, Aqil, Amri, Dahiyat al-Assad, Jam'iyat al-Fayha', Jabal Badro, Karan Jabal and Salihin neighbourhoods, the Castello trade centre, the Assad Military Academy and the area near the paperboard factory in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, terrorists shelled Hawsh Nasri, Irbin, Harasta and Hawsh Kharabu, and an electric power station in Jawbar.

Terrorists shelled Hamamiyat and Muhradah in Hama governorate; and Shaykh Miskin in Dar'a governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which announced that they would cease hostilities and informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours one humanitarian operation was carried out in the Hananu-3 district of Aleppo city and in the Mahalij camp for refugees of Aleppo governorate, during which approximately 6 tons of humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians.

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional Information

Over the past 24 hours, 3,193 citizens, including 1,587 children, have left besieged areas of the eastern part of Aleppo city with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides.

United Nations S/2016/1022

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 November 2016

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of the Russian Federation on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 10 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stating that Mr. Vadim A. Sokolov and Mr. Boris S. Lukshin have been appointed alternate representatives of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

16-21405 (E) 081216

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement released by the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 1 December 2016, with regard to the adoption of the "sanctions resolution" imposed by the United Nations Security Council against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21496 (E) 081216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement released by the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The United Nations Security Council has adopted a "sanctions resolution" faulting the nuclear warhead explosion test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 2016.

The DPRK strongly censures and categorically rejects the "sanctions resolution" as another excess of authority and a violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK by the Security Council acting under the instructions of the United States.

The successful test of the DPRK was one of the practical steps taken by it to tackle the nuclear threat and sanctions by the United States and other hostile forces desperately taking issue with the exercise of the right of the DPRK to self-defence, and it is also a demonstration of the toughest stand of the service personnel and people of the DPRK that they are ready to launch a counter-attack in case the enemy makes a provocation.

Many countries, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, have so far conducted thousands of nuclear tests and rocket launches, but the Security Council has never prevented them from doing so.

Obama and his lackeys are sadly mistaken if they calculate that they can force the DPRK to abandon its line of nuclear weaponization and undermine its status as a nuclear power through base sanctions to pressure it.

The DPRK will never deal with them, but will, more dynamically, advance along the road of justice chosen by it.

The "sanctions resolution" that has denied outright the sovereignty of the DPRK and its rights to existence and development will trigger its tougher countermeasures for self-defence.

Sanctions will inevitably escalate tensions, and the United States, the chief culprit of the "sanctions resolution", will be held wholly accountable in case the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is pushed into an uncontrollable phase.

United Nations S/2016/1024

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith a list clarifying the numbers of civilian casualties and injuries resulting from mortar shells and explosive devices attacks committed by terrorist armed groups in Syria in the period from 22 October to 21 November 2016 (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21402 (E) 061216

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Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

List of civilian casualties and injuries resulting from mortar shells and explosive devices attacks committed by terrorist armed groups in Syria in the period from 22 October to 21 November 2016

City	*Casualties*	*Injuries*
Damascus	9	86 (including 5 children)
Damascus suburb	9 (including 1 child)	69 (including 9 children)
Dar'a	5 (including 5 children)	10 (including 5 children)
Suwayda'	2	–
Homs	7 (including 2 children)	22 (including 6 children)
Hama	6 (including 2 children)	29 (including 7 children)
Ladhiqiyah	1	16
Aleppo	98 (including 22 children)	586 (including 90 children)
Dayr al-Zawr	6	83 (including 4 children)
Hasakah	3 (including 2 children)	3 (including 1 children)
Qunaytirah	1	7
Total	**147 (including 34 children)**	**911 (including 127 children)**

United Nations A/71/647–S/2016/1025

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
6 December 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 41
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 28 November 2016, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

16-21575 (E) 121216

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Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 22 November 2016, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (S/2016/990), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued ... notices to airmen", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus as "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly states, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that

have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2015 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at nearly 3,500,000 (compared with 3,250,000 in 2014), while a 7 per cent increase in that number is expected in 2016. Moreover, in 2015, nearly 26,000 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure, and around 210,000 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace, a total that is expected to increase by 7 per cent in 2016. In that respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are at a critical stage, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides, and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance for a results-oriented negotiating process within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus, and we encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2016/1026

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 December 2016

Original: English

Egypt, New Zealand and Spain: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2175 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2209 (2015), 2254 (2015), 2258 (2015) and 2268 (2016),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Gravely distressed by the continued deterioration of the devastating humanitarian situation in Syria, and the fact that now more than 13.5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria, and that about 6.1 million people are internally displaced (in addition to the half a million Palestinian refugees who had settled in Syria), and several hundred thousand people are suffering in besieged areas,

Emphasizing that the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region, and will continue to deteriorate further in the absence of a full implementation of the cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis, and stressing in this regard that there is no military solution to the conflict in Syria,

Reaffirming its intent, expressed in its resolution 2258 (2015) to take further measures in the event of non-compliance with that resolution and resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014),

Recalling that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decisions,

1. *Decides* that all parties to the Syrian conflict shall cease, 24 hours after the adoption of this resolution, any and all attacks in the city of Aleppo, including with any weapons, including rockets, mortars, and anti-tank guided missiles, and including shelling and airstrikes, to allow urgent humanitarian needs to be addressed for a period of 7 days and expresses its intention to consider further extensions for 7-day periods on a recurring basis, and *demands* that all parties allow and facilitate immediate, safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to all of Aleppo by the United Nations and its implementing partners;

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2. *Demands*, in addition to paragraph 1, that all parties, immediately implement and ensure full implementation of the cessation of hostilities, including the call for humanitarian agencies to be provided with rapid, safe, and unhindered access throughout Syria, as described in resolution 2268 (2016), including the Annex referred to therein and *stresses* that the cessation of hostilities does not apply to offensive or defensive action again the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council;

3. *Demands* that all parties to the Syrian conflict, in particular the Syrian authorities, immediately comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable, including with respect to all besieged and hard-to-reach areas, and fully and immediately implement all the provisions of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) 2191 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2254 (2015), 2258 (2015) and 2268 (2016), and recalls that violations and abuses committed in Syria must not go unpunished;

4. *Strongly* condemns acts of violence, attacks and threats against the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities;

5. *Calls upon* the parties to the conflict to support the United Nations' and its implementing partners' planning for, and actions to facilitate expeditiously, including through local agreements, the evacuation of the wounded and sick, the elderly, children and maternity cases from besieged and hard to reach areas to places of their choosing based solely on urgency and need, as well as all those wishing to depart Aleppo voluntarily, and stresses the need for civilians to be respected as such and permitted to move freely to places of their choosing;

6. *Calls upon* all States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, and *recalls* its decision in paragraph 2 of resolution 2253 with respect to ensuring that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to ISIL (also known as Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and its clarification in paragraph 19 that the obligation in paragraph 1(d) of resolution 1373 (2001) applies to making funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose;

7. *Demands* all parties to the conflict cease all collaboration with ISIL, Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council; and *further demands* that all combatants not designated by the Security Council take steps to separate expeditiously from terrorists designated by the Security Council, and also demands members of the International Syria Support Group to dissuade any party from fighting in collaboration with terrorists designated by the Security Council;

8. *Demands* that all parties to the cessation, within 10 days of the adoption of this resolution, indicate publically, or to the Co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group, their commitment to remain a party to the cessation of hostilities and stresses the need in this regard for their implementation of the provisions of this resolution;

9. *Welcomes* discussions between the Co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group together with other Member States and the United Nations, in Lausanne on 15 October and subsequently in Geneva, and urges those involved to translate those discussions into actions that improve the humanitarian situation of the Syrian people and contribute to the full implementation of this resolution; and *welcomes* in this regard the urgent provision of mobile hospitals and medical personnel currently deployed to Aleppo;

10. *Calls* upon all relevant Member States, in particular the members of the International Syria Support Group, to coordinate efforts in order to:

(i) Ensure adequate monitoring of the ceasefire in the city of Aleppo as well as the cessation of hostilities throughout Syria in accordance with the procedures set out by the Co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group;

(ii) Allow and facilitate immediate, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to all areas, including to besieged and hard to reach areas throughout Syria, on the basis of needs assessed by the United Nations and its implementing partners;

(iii) Prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL, Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qa'ida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council, and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Syria;

11. *Reaffirms* that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law;

12. *Demands* the full and immediate implementation of the political process outlined in resolution 2254, and in that respect reiterates that the only sustainable solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people in line with the Geneva Communiqué and resolution 2254, and in this regard strongly supports the intention of the Secretary-General, through his good offices and the efforts of his Special Envoy for Syria, to convene formal negotiations as soon as possible;

13. *Requests* that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution and provide options to preserve the cessation of hostilities, including provision of assistance and protection of civilians in the city of Aleppo, within 10 days of the adoption of this resolution and subsequently within the framework of its reporting on resolution 2268 (2016), taking into account discussions held in Lausanne and Geneva;

14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations A/71/648–S/2016/1027

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
5 December 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, on 1 and 2 December 2016, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine conducted test flights with practice launches of surface-to-air guided missiles from the territory of Ukraine over the territory of Ukraine, its territorial waters in the Black Sea and over the high seas, where Ukraine bears the responsibility for air traffic services, in accordance with international aviation law and multilateral and bilateral agreements approved by the International Civil Aviation (ICAO) Council decision of 17 February 1997 (EUR/NAT96/38-ATS).

In full compliance with international law, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine announced these test flights in advance. To guarantee safe use of airspace the Ukrainian side issued a notice to airmen regarding the establishment of temporarily dangerous areas in a specified part of the Ukrainian airspace over the Black Sea.

Ukraine announced in a timely manner the closure of air traffic in certain areas of the airspace that are under the sovereignty of Ukraine according to articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.

The Ukrainian side did not receive any requests from the Russian side for additional clarifications, as provided for under the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Instead, the Russian side unlawfully interfered in air traffic control over the Black Sea where Ukraine bears the responsibility for air traffic services, as well as officially threatened to use force against the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine located on the territory of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian side considers such actions of the Russian side as yet another act of aggression against the sovereignty of Ukraine, a violation of international obligations regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine, of the inviolability of Ukraine's borders, of the peaceful settlement of disputes, of the non-use of force or

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threat of force as well as of the strengthening of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region, as per provisions under the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act of OSCE of 1975, the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, the ICAO Council decision of February 1997 (EUR/NAT96/38-ATS) and other bilateral and multilateral international agreements.

The Ukrainian side has taken comprehensive measures to exclude any threats to civil aviation and to minimize risks created by the Russian Federation.

Ukraine proceeds from the understanding that all responsibility for the threat of use of military force by the Russian Federation against Ukraine as well as possible negative consequences of this threat lie exclusively with the Russian Federation.

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/71/667–S/2016/1028

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 December 2016
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 34
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 23 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical table of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of October 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be issued as document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21770 (E) 151216 191216

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Annex to the identical letters dated 23 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in October 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 October	1055	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, an Israeli enemy soldier at the Ra's al-Naqurah position pointed a vehicle-mounted machine gun at members of a Lebanese Army patrol.
	1130	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Labbunah, Israeli enemy personnel at the Labbunah position pointed a vehicle-mounted machine gun towards members of a Lebanese Army patrol. The enemy personnel also made obscene gestures and directed insults in the Arabic language.
8 October	–	At various times, opposite the town of Blida, the Israeli enemy crossed the technical fence between points BP28 and B60 and, using a construction vehicle, proceeded to build a dirt road approximately 200 metres long adjacent to the technical fence between the above-mentioned points. In so doing, the enemy crossed the Blue Line at point BP28 and covered an area approximately 5 metres in depth and 3 metres in width. At 1030 hours, an enemy patrol consisting of two Hummer vehicles arrived from occupied territory. Three personnel disembarked at point BP28, one of whom pointed his weapon towards a Lebanese Army patrol.
	1030	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Blida, an enemy patrol consisting of two Hummer vehicles arrived from occupied territory. Three personnel disembarked at point BP28 and one of them pointed his weapon towards a Lebanese Army patrol that was inside Lebanon.
11 October	1000	As Lebanese farmers were gathering the olive harvest and pruning olive trees on the outskirts of the town of Aytarun, in the Khillat al-Ghamiqah area near point B56-1, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a Defender vehicle arrived, whereupon 10 personnel disembarked from the vehicles and took combat positions. The enemy patrol left at 1130 hours, after the farmers had departed.
16 October	2200-2220	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal near point B64, an enemy soldier disembarked from a Hummer vehicle and pointed a handheld searchlight at Lebanese territory.
	2332	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, on the outskirts of Shab'a town, the Israeli enemy fired a flare shell from its N473 position (the Radar position) over the L341 position (Birkat al-Naqqar) of the Lebanese Army.
18 October	1000	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Fatimah gate, an Israeli enemy soldier pointed his weapon at a Lebanese Army patrol and the liaison unit of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
24 October	1200	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Lebanese Army Udaysah checkpoint, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Defender vehicle and eight soldiers arrived on the scene and cleared weeds alongside the technical fence. Three of the enemy soldiers pointed their weapons towards Lebanese territory. The enemy patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1245 hours.
25 October	0945	Opposite the town of Marwahin, Israeli enemy forces used a trench-digger to clear brush alongside the technical fence between points B24 (2) and B24. The arm of the trench-digger crossed the Blue Line several times, extending approximately one metre each time into Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy finished its work at 1200 hours, but the trench-digger remained at the location.
26 October	1300	Upon being informed by UNIFIL that the Israeli enemy was claiming that one of its personnel had been fired at from the Lebanese side of the border near point B82, opposite the town of Kafr Killa, a Lebanese Army patrol arrived on the scene in order to investigate. A soldier from the Israeli enemy's army fired two rounds at the Lebanese Army personnel, but no one was hit.
	1330	As a Syrian worker was travelling from Udaysah to Kafr Killa in a Rapid civilian vehicle, the vehicle came under fire from inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite a location where Israeli enemy soldiers were deployed. The vehicle was struck by two bullets, but no one was injured.
31 October	0900	The Israeli enemy continued the work that it had begun on 15 August 2016 inside the occupied Shab'a farms, opposite observation point OP2 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, between the old Shal position and the Radar position. The work was carried out by a D9 excavator and two trench-diggers, which were accompanied by an enemy patrol. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1400 hours and the vehicles withdrew in the direction of occupied territory.
	1215	Opposite the town of Blida, between points BP28 and BP29, an Israeli enemy excavator crossed the technical fence and proceeded to build a dirt road approximately 200 metres long adjacent to the technical fence between the above-mentioned points. The excavator's arm extended approximately one metre past the Blue Line at point BP28.

Sea violations committed in October 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 October	1800	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 October	0840	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 10-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 345 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
3 October	0810	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. The vessel's crew released an explosive charge and sounded warning sirens inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 October	1749	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2300	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of 15 seconds.
6 October	0520	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of 10 seconds.
	1115	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 45-second period, and proceeded on its way for some 351 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2200	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of 30 seconds and fired four flares over Lebanese territorial waters.
9 October	0508	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 425 metres, directing a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters, making announcements over loudspeakers in Hebrew and sounding warning sirens. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0913	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) and proceeded on its way for some 90 metres. It also fired a noise bomb and made announcements over loudspeakers. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
10 October	0931	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 35-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1045	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 35-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 225 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1610	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 148 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2310	From inside Palestinian territory, opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch opened fire in the direction of Lebanese territorial waters.
	2350	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of one minute.
13 October	0505	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 40-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0505-0519	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for three periods, first for 10 seconds and then twice again for a period of one minute. The vessel's crew also sounded warning sirens and made announcements in Hebrew over loudspeakers.
	0513	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of one minute. The vessel's crew spoke in Hebrew over loudspeakers and sounded warning sirens.
16 October	1720	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 10-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 425 metres. It approached a Lebanese fishing boat that was inside Lebanese territorial waters and launched a noise bomb inside those waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1725	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1730 hours, it again violated the boundary, for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1742 hours, it once more violated the boundary, for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
18 October	1025	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) and proceeded on its way for some 90 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 October	1735	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 October	1727	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a seven-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
28 October	1708	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a nine-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 October	1045	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, a blue, balloon-shaped plastic object coming from occupied Palestinian territorial waters violated the southern maritime boundary and moved some 300 metres into Lebanese territorial waters.
	1750	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
30 October	0600-0800	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, three balloon-shaped plastic objects — one blue, one white and one orange — coming from occupied Palestinian territorial waters violated the southern maritime boundary and moved into Lebanese territorial waters.
31 October	0002-0230	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of three minutes and then again for 30 seconds.

Air violations committed in October 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 October	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1235 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
3 October	0555	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.
4 October	0505	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1610 hours over Naqurah.
	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2030 hours over Naqurah.
	1045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1525 hours over Naqurah.
5 October	0505	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1245 hours over Naqurah.
	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1445 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 2010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 0430 hours on 6 October over Kafr Killa.
	1930	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 20.45 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
6 October	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 1655 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1210	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea to the west of Batrun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1455 hours over Rumaysh.
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2340 hours over Rumaysh.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Baalbek, Riyaq and Hirmil before leaving at 2320 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
7 October	0745	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1015 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Baalbek, Riyaq and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Rumaysh.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
8 October	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1905 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1820 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1405	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 October	0925	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Batrun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1140 hours over Naqurah.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
10 October	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1215 hours over Rumaysh.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2210 hours over Rumaysh.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Sarafand. It circled over the South before leaving at 1515 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over western Naqurah.
	2115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0320 hours on 11 October over Alma al-Sha'b.
11 October	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
12 October	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1805 hours over Naqurah.
13 October	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
14 October	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1515 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1325	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1705 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
15 October	1245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
16 October	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1855 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
17 October	1225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0655 hours on 18 October over Naqurah.
18 October	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1205 hours over Naqurah.
	1240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Batrun. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1900-1930	An Israeli enemy military aircraft operating in occupied airspace fired 11 decoy flares, five of which fell in Lebanese territorial waters.
19 October	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2015 hours over Rumaysh.
20 October	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2110 hours over Rumaysh.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1400 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1245 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
21 October	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2100 hours over Naqurah.
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1030 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
22 October	1010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Beirut. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1145 hours over Batrun.
	1155	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1835 hours over Kafr Killa.
23 October	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2010 hours over Rumaysh.
24 October	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2010 hours over Aytarun.
25 October	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2035 hours over Kafr Killa.
26 October	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and Juniyah before leaving at 1415 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Dinniyah, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1540 hours over Naqurah.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1420 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Iqlim al-Kharrub, Riyaq, Baalbek and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1230	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1450 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1650	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Batrun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1705 hours over Rumaysh.
27 October	0005	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0020 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1320 hours over Naqurah.
29 October	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1330 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Iqlim al-Kharrub, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1355 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Naqurah.
30 October	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1715 hours over Naqurah.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Iqlim al-Kharrub and the Shuf before leaving at 2000 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Beirut. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2025 hours over Naqurah.
31 October	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2305 hours over Rumaysh.

United Nations S/2016/1029

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 December 2016

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, it has been agreed to amend the reporting period established in paragraph 6 of resolution 2046 (2012), and subsequently amended in notes by the President of the Security Council (S/2013/657 and S/2014/613), to six-month intervals, beginning with the first report under the new timeline due to the Council by 15 May 2017.

16-21462 (E) 061216

Please recycle

United Nations S/2016/1030*

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you the concept note for the Security Council high-level open briefing on the theme "International judicial cooperation in countering terrorism" that will be held on 12 December 2016.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun**

* Reissued for technical reasons on 7 December 2016.

16-21487* (E) 071216

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Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the Security Council high-level open briefing on the theme "International judicial cooperation in countering terrorism", to be held on 12 December 2016

1. Background

Terrorism is a multidimensional phenomenon which requires global measures in order to be fully addressed. The transnational nature of terrorism, exacerbated by the use of information and communication technologies, demands a coordinated response from all States in the international community. Cooperation in judicial matters is an indispensable requirement in order to overcome the challenges faced in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts, particularly when the various elements of a case (evidence, suspects, witnesses) are spread throughout the jurisdictions of several States.

This is especially relevant in the light of the imminent threat posed by the return of foreign terrorist fighters. The phenomenon of returnees is a challenge to the capacities of States to counter terrorism and prosecute terrorists. In preventing and facing this threat, not only are the States targeted by terrorist activities involved, but also the neighbouring ones, as well as the States of origin, transit and return of foreign terrorist fighters. In the investigation and prosecution phase, issues such as the nationality of the perpetrators and the victims, or the State in which the crime was committed, are relevant. Furthermore, relevant evidence is often electronic, thus making its procurement and preservation difficult.

Recent events show us that judicial cooperation is still insufficient in the face of a relentless terrorist threat. In some cases, this is due to a lack of capacities and means, but it has also been fostered by the existence of slow and complicated proceedings for cooperation, normally a product of former times, when the dimension of the terrorist threat and the degree of response required by it were less dramatic.

Recently, high-level meetings on terrorism with Interior and Finance Ministers of Member States were held. This allowed the development of measures on police enforcement as well as on financing of terrorism, as set out in Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014), on foreign terrorist fighters, 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015). However, there has never been a meeting of Ministers of Justice on international cooperation in countering terrorism, nor has there been a resolution on international judicial cooperation.

2. Content of the draft resolution

The draft resolution which, if agreed, we intend to open for co-sponsorship to the wider membership of the United Nations, aims to have elements on reinforcement of the mechanisms for mutual legal assistance, with references to new information technologies, like the internet, to facilitate the processing, gathering and sharing of evidence with judicial authorities, with special focus on cooperation

orientated towards obtaining and preserving e-evidence, and reinforcing the central authorities network. It also seeks to strengthen police-to-police cooperation in several areas, including through the reinforcement of the INTERPOL I-24/7 communication network, as well as the development of regional networks of points of contact like the one approved by the Council of Europe in the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which is operative since 1 December 2016.

3. Format of the meeting

An open ministerial briefing of the Security Council under the presidency the Minister of Justice of Spain, Rafael Catalá Polo. Invitations have been addressed to his counterparts.

4. Briefers

- Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Jean-Paul Laborde.
- Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, Kenya, Dorcas Oduor.
- Executive Secretary of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, Malta, Robert Strang.

United Nations S/2016/1031

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you the concept note for the Security Council ministerial open debate on the theme "Trafficking in persons in conflict situations" (see annex), to be held on 20 December 2016.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun**

16-21486 (E) 071216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 2 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the Security Council ministerial open debate on the theme "Trafficking in persons in conflict situations", to be held on 20 December 2016

Background

Conflicts amplify the risks for trafficking in persons. Armed groups and criminal networks engage in trafficking in the territories in which they operate as well as in cross-border activities, typically trafficking in women and girls for profit, marriage and sexual slavery, while men and boys are often trafficked for forced labour in the mining sector and as porters, soldiers and slaves. People escaping from war and persecution are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking. In the context of the current mass migration crisis, settings for refugees and internally displaced persons are indeed prime targets for traffickers.

In December 2015, the Security Council held its first thematic briefing on human trafficking in conflict. The subsequent presidential statement on human trafficking in situations of conflict (S/PRST/2015/25), adopted on 16 December 2015, requested the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on progress made in 12 months to implement better existing mechanisms countering trafficking in persons and to carry out the steps requested in the presidential statement.

The inclusion of human trafficking in the Security Council agenda was, in part, a response to the open promotion and practice of enslavement by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Daesh)[1] and Boko Haram, particularly of women and girls for the purposes of sexual slavery and of children as labourers, fighters and suicide bombers. The attitude of ISIL and Boko Haram to human trafficking differs from that of many other non-state armed groups: they treat human trafficking not just as a means to generate free labour, services and profit, but as a method of degradation, displacement and subjugation of targeted civilian populations.

Armed conflict

Armed conflicts and humanitarian crises expose those caught in the crossfire to increased risk of being trafficked both in and beyond conflict zones, and exacerbate many factors that increase individual and group vulnerability to human trafficking and that impact disproportionately on groups that already lack power and status in society, including women, children, migrants, refugees and the internally displaced. This has been confirmed in a number of recent reports, including the Secretary-General's first report on trafficking in persons in conflict (S/2016/949),

[1] ISIL/Daesh and ISIS are used interchangeably by various stakeholders.

reports of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)[2] and the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children,[3] and the research of the International Organization for Migration.[4]

The nexus between conflict-related sexual violence and human trafficking and its cross-border dynamics has been acknowledged by the Secretary-General in his 2016 report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2016/361/Rev.1), with information on smugglers demanding sex as "payment of passage" and of an evolving criminal infrastructure designed to exploit refugees through human trafficking, commercial sex and sexual slavery, including in the context of the current mass migration movements.

Civilian populations are viewed by some armed groups as a resource or commodity to be trafficked, as evidenced recently by the abduction and cross-border trafficking of Syrian and Iraqi women and children, and documented in the Secretary-General's report on conflict-related sexual violence (ibid.). Internally displaced and refugee women and girls in ISIL-controlled areas have been sold or forcibly married to fighters in armed groups or to wealthy foreigners.

Specific, sometimes new, forms of trafficking can emerge in the contexts of conflict, including when there is a high risk or incidence of atrocity crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Terrorist groups

In recent years, terrorist groups such as ISIL (also known as Daesh) and Boko Haram have openly advocated for and engaged in sexual enslavement and trading in women and girls through human trafficking. It should also be noted that the Secretary-General has raised concerns regarding sexual violence used by some extremist groups as a tactic of terrorism to advance their goals and ideology, and has highlighted the nexus of trafficking and conflict-related sexual violence, particularly in the context of crimes being committed by ISIL, Boko Haram and other extremist groups.[5] The Secretary-General's 2016 report on children and armed conflict (A/70/836-S/2016/360) noted reported cases of forced marriage to fighters and trafficking of girls into the Syrian Arab Republic by ISIL to be used as sex slaves.

The Secretary-General's 2016 report on conflict-related sexual violence also highlighted that the use of sexual violence by terrorist groups to increase their power, recruitment base and revenue through human trafficking in all its forms should be part of the global discourse and action on curbing financial flows to violent extremists. Trafficking in women and girls remains a critical component of

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[2] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014*, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.14.V.10, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP_2014_full_report.pdf. See also UNODC Global Report forthcoming in December 2016.

[3] Reports of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/HRC/32/41 of 3 May 2016 and A/71/303 of 5 August 2016.

[4] International Organization for Migration, *Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis: Evidence and Recommendations for Further Action to Protect Vulnerable and Mobile Populations*, Geneva, July 2015.

[5] Some of these concerns have been articulated in the two latest reports of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, S/2016/361/Rev.1 and S/2015/203.

the financial flows to ISIL and its affiliates.[6] Tactics include ransoming and sale of women and girls to mobilize resources and fund operations, with terrorists using modern technologies, such as encrypted messaging, to keep online bidding processes secret.[7]

The fourth global survey of the implementation by Member States of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (S/2016/49, annex) noted that cooperation with organized criminal networks provides terrorist groups with access to funding and resources through human trafficking, in particular of women and girls. The border control measures of States are thus vulnerable to systematic exploitation by human traffickers operating in close collaboration with terrorist groups. In his latest report (A/71/384), the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism raised concern that certain actions of Member States, such as push-back operations and criminalization of irregular migration, contribute to the establishment of chaotic and covert movements of people, including through human trafficking, and might ultimately assist those intent on committing acts of terrorism.

The use of existing mechanisms such as anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing tools, as well as sanctions regimes, to monitor and disrupt human trafficking in all its forms connected to conflict are crucial to a strengthened response to human trafficking in conflict.

Post-conflict settings

Human trafficking activities have also been noted in post-conflict contexts, fuelled by absent or dysfunctional law enforcement and justice institutions and the enhanced vulnerability of local populations. The involvement of civil society and groups of women in support of victims in post-conflict settings also has an important role to play in building peaceful societies.

Main questions

How can the Security Council better integrate the issue of trafficking in persons in conflict in all its forms into its work? How can it integrate the understanding of the nexus between human trafficking, conflict-related sexual violence and violent extremism?

How can the United Nations system organizations work closely together to confront human trafficking in conflict and in the context of terrorism while delivering their respective mandates? How can we mainstream the issue of trafficking in persons as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated mission assessment and planning and peacebuilding support?

How can Member States better implement applicable legal obligations to criminalize, prevent and otherwise combat trafficking in persons, including

[6] Reports of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Daesh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, S/2016/92 of 29 January 2016 and S/2016/501 of 31 May 2016.

[7] Ibid.

trafficking in persons in the context of conflict-related sexual violence and as a tactic of terrorism?

How can we better implement robust victim identification mechanisms and provide access to protection and assistance for identified victims, particularly in relation to conflict? How can humanitarian action effectively support and prioritize the victims of human trafficking and sexual violence when addressing humanitarian needs?

How can we ensure that evidence is preserved so that investigations and prosecutions may occur? How can we ensure accountability of those who engage in trafficking in persons in conflict situations?

What is the best way to mitigate the risk of public procurement and supply chains contributing to trafficking in persons in conflict? How can we create global awareness on this situation?

Format

The format is an open ministerial debate of the Security Council, open to United Nations Member States, under the presidency of His Excellency Mr. Mariano Rajoy Brey, Prime Minister of Spain.

In line with Spain's belief that open debates should provide an efficient platform for communication and interaction between the Security Council and the wider membership of the United Nations, the debate will be articulated in accordance with the following modalities:

(a) Briefers' introductory remarks will be limited to five minutes;

(b) Member States are strongly encouraged to deliver joint statements rather than individual statements. In that spirit, joint and coordinated group statements will be accorded priority in the list of speakers. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate the complete text in writing and deliver a condensed version in the Chamber.

Briefers

Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General, Mr. Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Ms. Zainab Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and a civil society representative (to be confirmed) will brief the Security Council at the open debate.

Outcome

We are hopeful that the Council will adopt a resolution to support efforts to eliminate human trafficking in persons in situations of conflict.